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Providing Pensions for U.K. Employees with Varied
Working Lives
Deborah R. Cooper*

Abstract
Several different working lives are investigated, including employees with
breaks in employment, part-time employment, and temporary employment.
The pensions that could be provided to the different employees by final salary,
revalued career average, or money purchase pension schemes (plans) are calculated and compared. Some of the weaknesses in a final salary pension scheme
(the treatment of deferred pensioners and cross subsidies between different
groups of member) are considered. Possible alternative benefit structures are
considered to address the problems.
Key words and phrases: pension scheme, defined benefit, final salary, revalued
career average, money purchase
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Introduction

Most occupational pension schemes l in the U.K. are defined benefit final salary schemes (GAD, 1991). Such schemes aim to provide
a penSion at retirement based on years of service completed with the
sponsoring employer and salary received in the years immediately preceding retirement. Occupational pension schemes were introduced to
meet the different needs of employers and employees: employers want
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England. She joined the university after working for the Government Actuary's Department and for W.M. Mercer. Dr. Cooper has a B.Sc. in mathematics from the University of
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She is a Fellow of the Institute of Actuaries.
Dr. Cooper's address is: Department of Actuarial Science and Statistics, City
University, Northampton Square, London, ECIV OHB, ENGLAND. Internet address:
D.R.Cooper@City.ac.uk
1 Pension

schemes are called pension plans in the U.S.
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a tax-efficient and paternalistic means of controlling their workforce,
and employees want a secure pension in retirement that bears some relation to the income they had received while working (Hannah, 1986). In
the past employees were expected to stay with one employer throughout most of their working lifetime. Consequently, pension schemes
were designed with retirement in mind, often giving no entitlement to
benefit on early withdrawal.

1.1

Early Withdrawal Benefits

The benefits occupational pension schemes provide for early withdrawals have improved considerably since pension schemes were introduced. In the private sector the change has arisen largely as a result
of legislation. In the U.K. early withdrawals (with more than two years'
qualifying service 2 ) now can expect a deferred pension increasing between the time of withdrawal and retirement at 5 percent per annum or
the rate of increase in the retail prices index over this period, whichever
is less. The value of the early withdrawal benefit, however, is still likely
to be less than the reserve that would normally be held for an equivalent
member remaining in the scheme. The difference between the value of
the withdrawal and staying benefits can reduce job mobility.
Because individuals who leave money purchase pension schemes
receive the full value of the reserve held (ignoring any surrender penalties), money purchase pension schemes are considered to be more portable. The withdrawal benefit now provided by final salary pension
schemes is a substantial improvement over what was available 20 years
ago;3 it is also better than what is available in many other countries
with occupational pension schemes (FEE, 1995). Final salary pension
schemes therefore have made a significant effort to rectify a major
weakness in their retirement benefit provisions; at the same time they
often have improved the level of other benefits that they offer.

1.2

Final Salary Pension Schemes

Many pension schemes are designed with the view of providing a
target benefit which usually is expressed in terms of an indiVidual's
annual salary immediately before retirement, i.e., final salary. Final
salary pension schemes frequently are criticized for the benefits they
2Qualifying service is service that contributes toward the pension that will be paid
from the scheme, which may include deferred benefits.
3Prior to 1978 members of occupational pension schemes had no statutory right to
a withdrawal benefit.
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provide to certain types of employees, in particular for the cross subsidies that exist between various categories of members. (For example,
see Disney, 1995.) Despite their apparent faults, however, they make an
increasingly important contribution to the income of pensioners (Johnson and Stears, 1995). It is necessary to understand the Significance of
the problems in their design and to discover whether it is possible to
amend them.
For those persons who do not have a substantial period of continuous service with one employer up to retirement, final salary pension
schemes may not provide the best option. For these persons money
purchase provision may offer better value for money. Value for money,
however, is a difficult concept to judge. For example, money purchase
pension schemes may offer employees a better rate of investment return than a defined benefit pension scheme (Disney, 1995), but they
also carry the possibility of a worse return.
In a defined benefit pension scheme the investment risk largely is
carried by the sponsoring employer. In a money purchase pension
scheme, however, the plan participant takes the risk. This makes money
purchase pension schemes more or less attractive according to the individual concerned's attitude toward risk. Similarly, there may be greater
flexibility within a money purchase pension scheme. For example, an
individual member of a money purchase pension scheme normally will
be able to choose which benefits the scheme should provide and to select a retirement age. Taking advantage of the fleXibility, however, is
likely to make the pension scheme more expensive.

1.3

Objectives

Because of the changing nature of employment [with much new employment being of the temporary or part-time variety (CSO, 1996)], it is
important to consider the impact of changing workplace dynamics on
the accumulation of pension benefits. This paper examines the pension
benefits provided by different types of U.K. pension schemes to persons
with different working lives and compares them with the benefits provided by a final salary pension scheme. Several categories of working
lifetimes are defined,4 and the retirement benefits accrued in the different pension schemes by each category are calculated and compared
under various scenarios. Though the arguments put forward in this
paper are based in the situation in the U.K., the problem of providing
4 Appendix

1 defines terms which may not transcend international boundaries.
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pensions for employees with different working histories is not unique
to the U.K., and the paper's conclusions can be applied more generally.
Final salary pension schemes are not risk free for all members. For
early withdrawals there is the risk that they may be unable to achieve
an adequate final salary pension because of the incomplete portability
offered by final salary pension schemes compared to money purchase
pension schemes. The paper attempts to quantify this risk.
A profound concern in performing this type of comparison is that
less than 50 percent of the workforce in the U.K. has occupational pension schemes available to them (GAD, 1991). The past 15 years in the
U.K. (and in many other industrialized countries) have seen a shift in
the nature of employment from permanent full-time jobs to part-time
and temporary work (CSO, 1992; Polivka, 1996). In the European Union
there are approximately 14 million part-time and 10 million temporary
workers. Table 1 shows the position of the U.K.
Those with part-time or temporary jobs are least likely to have access
to occupational pension schemes, even when such pension schemes are
provided by their employers (GAD, 1991; Hipple and Stewart, 1996).
Even when they are available, final salary pension schemes are considered to provide poor value for money. Those companies that offer
pension schemes to their full-time employees but exclude part-time or
temporary employees frequently use this argument, together with concerns about administrative costs, to justify exclusion.
Table 1
Temporary and Part-Time Workers.
In Great Britain (Excluding Northern Ireland)
As a Percentage of All Employees
Temporary Work Part-Time Work
6.0%
4.3%
7.8%
4.0%
Males
85.7%
Females 7.8%
8.0%
80.1%
32.9%
Total
6.0%
6.9%
26.3%
Source: Social Trends, Volrunes 17, 25, and 27.

State pension schemes have been ignored throughout the paper for
the sake of SimpliCity.
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2 Varied Working Lives
2.1

Definitions of Varied Working Lives

Defined benefit pension schemes have developed assuming that the
average employee will have a long period of full-time employment with
one employer until retirement. This type of employee is becoming less
common in today's workforce. Other patterns of employment are increasingly likely to be the norm.
We will consider examples of different working lifetimes and will
look at the benefits possible under different pension arrangements.
These examples will encompass persons employed part time; persons
who are made redundant and who mayor may not return to work; persons who take time from paid employment to look after children or
other dependents; persons who change jobs frequently; and persons
who change the hours they work. The six basic categories of working
lifetimes have been taken from Davies and Ward's pamphlet for the
Equal Opportunities Commission (Davies and Ward, 1992). They are:
• No Breaks (that is, in paid full-time employment throughout the
working life);
• Break and Part-Time (that is, having time away from full-time paid
employment and then returning to part-time employment);
• Break and Full-Time (that is, having time away from full-time paid
employment and then returning to full-time employment);
• Break and Mixed (that is, having time away from full-time paid
employment and, having returned to employment, experiencing a
mixture of part-time and full-time employment) ;
• Late Break (that is, taking a break from full-time employment relatively late in life) ;
• Late Start (that is, starting paid employment later than assumed
for the other classes of employee)
These categories were designed primarily to consider the working
patterns of women who took time away from paid employment to care
for children (for example, break and part-time) or elderly relatives (for
example, late break). With little adaptation they can be used to consider
the working lifetimes of employees (both male and female) who have

10
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been made redundant and not been able to find replacement employment or who have only been able to find short-term or temporary employment. To make the calculations more comprehensive and to deal
with these alternatives, some extra histories have been considered. The
considerations result in a total of eleven categories. For example, variations of late break are conSidered, where the break is either short or
long. Finally, a cyclical working pattern has been included to portray
the experience of many semi-skilled and low-skilled workers whose opportunities for employment tend to vary according to the economic
cycle.
Additional calculations have been performed for employees who
change jobs regularly throughout their working lifetimes, but are always assumed to be in employment. The labor markets in the U.K. and
the U.S. appear to be characterized by high turnover at young ages and
increasing tenure as employees age. Some figures are given in Tables
2 and 3. In the U.K. the average tenure has not changed significantly
over the past ten years (CSO, 1997); in the U.S. there is some debate
about whether average job tenures are falling (Farber, 1995; Swinnerton and Wial, 1995). It is estimated that the probability of an employee
in the U.S. remaining in paid employment for longer that four years is
approximately 50 percent (Swinnerton and Wial, 1995).
Table 2
Average Job Tenure in the U.K.
Males
Females

1986
9.4 years
6.5 years

1996
8.9 years
7.1 years

Table 3
Median Job Tenure in U.S.
Age
1993
25-34
3.2 years
35-44
5.8 years
45-54
9.5 years
55-64
12.4 years
Periods of job security increase with age, which is to the relative
advantage of a final salary scheme because the value of these schemes
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is weighted toward employment close to retirement age. In contrast, the
value of money purchase schemes is weighted toward employment at
younger ages. Full details of the assumptions made about the different
categories of employment are given in Appendix 2.

2.2

Measuring Benefits for Different Categories of Employment

A difficulty in dealing with diverse groups of persons is finding a
standard of comparison for the benefits provided by the different pension schemes that is appropriate for all concerned. There are several
possible choices of benchmark, each one with certain advantages and
disadvantages. Two used in this paper are described below.

2.2.1

Total Service Pension

One measure to use as a benchmark is the pension that could be
provided from a final salary pension scheme, had all of the employee's
service been completed in consecutive years, in a pension scheme that
does not distinguish part-time and full-time service. This is called the
total service penSion.
The total service pension is, arguably, the best pension a final salary
pension scheme can be expected to provide: it ignores breaks in service
as well as changes in type of employment. It does not compensate parttime employees and those taking breaks from employment for the lower
rates of salary growth assumed (see Section 4.3.3) and the shorter time
spent in paid employment; as expected, these employees do not have a
direct opportunity to recoup the earnings they have lost.

2.2.2

Final Salary

For final salary pension schemes, there is a choice of which final
salary to use. s If we choose the final basic salary of the individual
concerned, it becomes difficult to make comparisons across the board.
There is also an additional problem: for some groups final salary may
have been earned several years prior to retirement, while for others it
may not be an annual rate. On the other hand, if a comparison is made
sCommon definitions of final salary in the U.K. include basic salary earned in the 12
months preceding retirement; the average annual rate of basic salary earned in the 36
months preceding retirement; and the annual rate of salary at retirement, including the
average of 'fluctuating emoluments' over the preceding 36 months (GAD, 1991)
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with the employee's last earnings before retirement, we can get some
idea how well different pension schemes provide replacement income
for its members.
The results under final salary are influenced heavily by the total
amount of service; that is, the longer the employee has worked, the
better the pension scheme appears. With few exceptions the "full-time
and bonus" category of employee appears to do best using final salary
as a measure of performance, and the "break and mixed" category employees appear to do worst.
Other measures that do not depend on a particular working history demonstrate the force of two commonplace observations: first, the
longer the period over which the employee contributes to a money purchase pension scheme, the larger the expected benefit; second, making
provision in money purchase pension schemes early in the employee's
working lifetime is important. These observations both provide arguments in favor of a state pension, such as the basic state penSion in the
U.K., which underpinS other layers of benefit. 6

3 The Different Pension Schemes
The different pension schemes considered are deliberately simple.
For occupational pension schemes to succeed they must be attractive
to both employers and employees. A penSion scheme with a relatively
simple benefit design will be straightforward to manage and easy to
understand and so will be desired by both groups.
3.1

Final Salary Pension Scheme

The final salary penSion scheme used provides a pension of 1/60th
of final salary for each year of service completed. This is the most common accrual rate among contracted oue pension schemes in the U.K.
private sector (GAD, 1991); public sector schemes, which provide an accrual rate of 1/80th, provide a lump sum in addition to the pension. For
those employees working part time, the pension scheme provides a pension based on the annual rate of salary, with total service aggregated.
Someone retiring with a total of n years of service, with an average of
hi (hi:::; 40) hours per week during year i (i = 1,2, ... , n), where 40
6 A comparison with

the basic state pension is given in Appendix 3.
7That is, contracted out of the state earnings related pension scheme (Appendix 1).
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hours is considered full time, would receive an annual pension of:
S n h·

Annual Pension = 60

I

_t

i=140

where S is the annualized rate of salary received in the 12 months preceding retirement. Thus, someone retiring with a total of 30 years at
20 hours per week part time would receive an annual pension of:
.
S
20 S
Annual PenSIOn = - x 30 x - = 60
40 4·

Those pension scheme members who work different part-time hours at
different points in their career will have the appropriate proportion of
each year of service used in the calculation.
A further consideration is how members of pension schemes are
treated when they move from one category of employment to another.
For example, if an employee moves from full-time to part-time status,
some penSion schemes make the full-time entitlement paid-up 8 and
start accrual in the pension scheme afresh as a part-time employee.
This may be the case if a separate pension scheme is operated for parttime employees. Other pension schemes may consider the two periods continuous service. Where relevant, results are presented on both
bases.
Finally, we consider the position of pension schemes that allow employees to take extended breaks and return to service, counting the
periods of employment at either side of the break as one consecutive
period for accrual purposes. Several pension schemes, particularly in
the public sector, allow past members who rejoin the pension scheme
after a break from employment to have service counted as continuous
on payment of a small contribution, usually related to pay at previous
withdrawal. In effect, this is the total service penSion.

3.2

Revalued Career Average Pension Scheme

The revalued career average pension scheme provides a pension of
1/60th of the revalued career average salary for each year of service.
Calculations have been made assuming a rate of revaluation in line with
price inflation as well as one in line with growth in earnings. The former
rate of revaluation will make the pension scheme perform less well
8That is, the accrued pension is frozen, receiving only statutory revaluation rather
than increasing in line with salaries.
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than a final salary pension scheme for a full-time employee. Also, if
revaluation is in line with increases in salaries, then, the final salary
pension scheme and the revalued career average pension schemes are
identical for full-time employees.
In this revalued career average pension scheme there is no difficulty
with the treatment of early withdrawals, because the same rate of revaluation is applied to deferred benefits. The different categories of members do not have to be considered separately. The state earnings-related
pension scheme operates in this way.
The pension for part-time employees is calculated Similarly to the
final salary pension scheme.
3.3

Money Purchase Pension Scheme

Two money purchase pension schemes are included in the analysis:
• Employees contribute 5 percent of their salaries throughout their
working lifetimes .
• When employees are in full-time paid employment they contribute
the maximum amount to the pension scheme, which, for simplicity, is assumed to be 17.5 percent of salary at all ages. For parttime employees, however, they contribute only 5 percent of salary
at all ages.
The first arrangement was selected because, on average, the contribution to occupational pension schemes made by members is about 5
percent of their salaries (GAD, 1991). Few employers have chosen to
make contributions to the private money purchase pension schemes
(or personal pension plans) of their employees. Consequently, it seems
reasonable to calculate the amount of pension that could be provided
with the contributions saved by opting out of an occupational pension
scheme. For simplicity the calculations do not allow explicitly for expenses. Implicit allowances are made instead.
There are several reasons for the two tiers of contribution in the
second plan. First, those with low pay have less opportunity to save, so
it seems unreasonable to suppose those employees would continue to
invest the same proportion of their salaries in a penSion scheme if they
moved from full-time to part-time employment (Table 4). Second, if an
employer were to contribute to a money purchase pension scheme, it
seems most likely that they would do so only for full-time employees. 9
9That a low level of contribution will lead to a low level of benefit is not a failure of
money purchase schemes. The problems of money purchase schemes that this paper
considers are those of volatility and high cost.

Cooper: Providing Pensions for Employees

15

Finally, most individual money purchase pension schemes have a fixed
charge deducted from each contribution, so the value to the plan participant of the contribution made reduces with the amount. Thus, the
lower tier acts partly as an implicit allowance for per policy fees.
Table 4
Distribution of U.K. Annual Household Expenditure
On Personal Pensions by Gross Income
Quintiles
5th
4th
3rd
2nd
1st (Top)
Lowest Bound
£117 £223
£367
£556
Avg Wkly Exp £0.25 £0.84 £2.68 £4.54
£14.92
Source: Family Spending, (50,1995; Avg Wkly Exp

=

Average Weekly Expenditure.

In addition we consider what level of contribution would be required
by a money purchase scheme (given the assumptions made) in order to
reproduce the retirement benefit provided by the final salary scheme.

4

Assumptions

The calculations have been performed for an employee starting employment on £16,000. This is close to the average wage for male employees in 1995. In most cases the absolute figure does not matter, as
the comparison is done using proportions and percentages. In addition, it is assumed that the basic state pension will continue to increase
in line with the Retail Prices Index, as it has since 1979. Other assumptions are specified below.

4.1

Service

The calculations assume a full working lifetime consists of 40 hours
paid employment per week from age 20 to 60; the maximum pension in
the final salary pension scheme is 2/3rds of salary. Pension payments
to retirees start at the normal pensionable age, which is age 60. It could
be argued that 65 is a more realistic retirement age because most pension schemes have a normal pension age of 65 for men, and the trend
seems to be to equalize pension ages for men and women at age 65
(GAD, 1991). The average age at which pension payments commence,
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as reported in the Government Actuary's Survey, is about age 61, however. Employees often take early retirement, whether voluntarily or not.
An older normal retirement age would enhance the apparent performance of money purchase pension schemes because of the effect of
compound interest and mortality. The calculations assume that employees start contributing to money purchase pension schemes at age
20, however, and the early commencement age partially offsets the effect of the early retirement age, so this apparent unfairness has largely
been ignored.
Part-time employees have been included at two levels of service.
Over 5 million persons work part time in the U.K., of whom about 80
percent are women. Significant proportions of male part-time employees are those already in retirement from their main occupation (GAD,
1991), and it is difficult to make allowance for this group. Until women
have children, those in employment are largely in full-time work (Martin and Roberts, 1984). Of these, 50 percent return to work within
nine months of having a baby; about 30 percent return to full-time employment (McRae and Daniel, 1991). Many of the remainder return to
part-time work once their children are in school. We can assume that,
to some extent, women choose to work part-time because of child care
responsibilities.
Part-time employees are assumed to work for either 40 percent (that
is, 16 hours) or 75 percent (that is, 30 hours) of a full working week. In
addition, the service histories of some part-time employees used in the
analysis assume that women are able to choose to work longer hours
as their children grow older. There is some evidence to support this
pattern (EOCNI, 1993). For example, the "break-and-mixed" category
assumes the employee starts by working full-time; stops paid employment to care for young children; returns to paid part-time employment
of 16 hours per week; has a further break; and then works until retirement at 30 hours per week.

4.2

Mortality

Except in the calculation of the annuity used for converting the
money purchase fund into a penSion, mortality is ignored throughout
the analysis. This has different implications for the defined benefit pension schemes and for the money purchase pension scheme, although
the effect on death benefits is the same. By ignoring mortality the analysis assumes that the death benefits provided are equal in value to the
reserve or actuarial liability.

Cooper: Providing Pensions for Employees
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Money Purchase Pension Scheme

By ignoring mortality when accumulating the contributions paid to
the money purchase pension scheme the analysis assumes that, on
death before retirement, the value of the fund is applied to purchase
benefits for any dependent survivor or is paid to the estate of the plan
participant.
We assume that the full accumulated fund is used to purchase retirement pension. Death benefits in addition to those provided by the
accumulated fund must be purchased with additional contributions. In
general this means that unless an additional contribution is paid, the
provision for dependents on early death will be inadequate.

4.2.2

Defined Benefit Pension Schemes

The average defined benefit pension scheme provides a lump sum
death benefit of nearly three times pensionable salary together with a
spouse's pension calculated allowing for some enhancement of service
(GAD, 1991). In the private sector this is usually up to full potential
service. Except for older employees, the value of these benefits is likely
to be greater than the reserve required to fund the retirement benefit.
Ignoring mortality can result in an underestimate of the cost of a
money purchase pension scheme and of the value of the benefits from
a defined benefit pension scheme. Rather than adjust the calculations
to allow for this difference between the two types of pension scheme,
we will discuss it in the results section.
The other decrements affecting pension schemes are withdrawal and
ill health retirement. These are considered in later sections of this paper.

4.3

Economic Assumptions

Interest rate assumptions are needed to project the accumulated
value of the money purchase fund; as a yardstick to measure salary
growth and inflation; and to cost the annuity at retirement. These rates
are difficult to predict, and the results are sensitive to the assumptions
chosen. For this reason, a sensitivity analysis is included as part of
the results. The interest rates are assumed to be constant over time
as the comparison of results is made only at the end of one period of
time. The rates reflect an average of the experience over the period of a
person's working lifetime. Each assumption is briefly discussed below.

18
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Inflation

The inflation assumption is used to increase benefits while in deferment and as a basis from which to estimate real rates of salary growth
and real interest rates.
It is assumed that the Retail Prices Index will increase 4 percent per
annum. This is slightly higher than the current U.K. government's selfimposed maximum inflation target, but lower than the average over the
past 20 years.
If inflation is higher than that assumed in the projection, then nominal investment return will improve if the real rate of investment return remains the same. Similarly, if real rates of salary growth remain
the same, salaries paid will be higher. Thus, money purchase pension
schemes will perform relatively better than otherwise, having higher
income from investments and contributions; defined benefit pension
schemes will award pensions based on a higher salary figure. The benefit design of the pension schemes will determine which arrangement
gives the better value for money.

4.3.2

Real Interest Rates

The assumption for real interest rates is combined with the inflation assumption to accumulate the contributions made to the money
purchase fund. A real rate of return of 4 percent per annum has been
assumed. This rate reflects what is currently available on longer term
index-linked gilts lO (roughly 3.5 percent on gilts maturing in 2030, as
of March 1996) which gives a conservative estimate of the likely investment performance of a fund (Thornton and Wilson, 1992). This approach can be justified for two reasons: first, the rate used is assumed
to be net of expenses (to allow implicitly for expenses), and second,
most persons included in the categories of employees in this survey
will be on fairly low and insecure incomes and probably would want a
personal pension plan giving a reasonably secure investment return.
In the U.K. it seems that a small majority of investors in personal
pension plans prefer more cautious, with profit, poliCies to unit-linked
policies (ABI, 1996). Some figures are given in Table 5. Some of the
linked poliCies are linked to with-profit or fixed interest unitized funds.
Low interest rates penalize the money purchase pension scheme
both by depressing the assumed performance of the pension scheme
and by making the annuity more expensive. In order to explore a plau10 Gilts

is the name given to securities issued by the United Kingdom government.
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Table 5
Personal Pensions: New Business
(In £1,OOO,OOOs)
1991 1993
Number of New Policies
2595 2030
Net Premium Income:
Single Premium-Linked
1719 2393
Single Premium-Non-Linked 2254 2626
Yearly Premium-Linked
600
580
Yearly Premium-Non-Linked 519
517
DSS* Rebate-Linked
369
207
DSS* Rebate-Non-Linked
226
139
Total
5688 6462
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1995
1199
1675
1628
536
411
92
53
4395

*The DSS rebate is the contribution paid by the Department of Social
Security to appropriate personal pension schemes (Appendix 1).

sible range of results, calculations also have been performed assuming
real interest rates of 5 percent.

4.3.3

Real Salary Growth

The assumption for real salary growth also can be considered to be
low: a real rate of salary growth of 1 percent per annum has been assumed. While average salaries increased faster than this over the 1980s,
there is no certainty that they will continue to do so. At present, only
senior executive salaries are increasing faster than the rate of inflation,
and these employees are unlikely to have part-time contracts. Calculations also are performed assuming 2 percent real growth. This is to be
consistent with the 5 percent real growth tested above, as a 4 percent
gap between real interest rates and real salary growth may be too large.
The analysis assumes that salaries only increase faster than inflation
when an employee is in full-time work. At ages when a working profile imposes part-time work, salaries are increased in line with inflation
only. Similarly, after a period of unemployment, the salary at which the
employee is assumed to reenter employment will be the salary at the
previous date of exit increased in line with inflation only. There is evidence to support these assumptions, as well as the belief that part-time
employees are usually paid less than the equivalent full-time employees. This can be shown by comparing hourly rates and by considering
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measures of productivity (Kremer and Montgomery, 1993). No attempt
has been made to allow for different relative levels of pay in the analysis.
A consequence of the assumption that real salary growth only occurs
during periods of full-time employment is that those taking breaks from
employment will return to work at a relatively lower level of pay than
their contemporaries who remained in full-time work.
lust as assuming large real investment returns will result in a better
performance for money purchase pension schemes, larger real salary
growth will mean defined benefit pension schemes pay a larger pension. In the case of high real investment returns, however, the apparent advantage accrues only to the money purchase pension scheme. In
the case of high salary growth, there is an advantage to both types
of pension schemes: the money purchase pension scheme benefits
from larger contributions. In practice, if investment returns are better
than expected over the long term, members of defined benefit pension
schemes can expect to receive some advantage. In the past, surplus in
occupational pension schemes has been used to make (discretionary)
increases to pensions in payment and, less frequently, other benefit
improvements.

4.3.4 The Annuity
An interest rate consistent with the inflation and real interest rate
assumptions above has been used to calculate the annuity.
The comparison between the money purchase and defined benefit
pension schemes has been made assuming that a pension increasing
at 4 percent per annum is purchased (that is, in line with limited price
increases, given the inflation assumption). According to the Government Actuary's survey (GAD, 1991), occupational pension schemes in
the private sector guarantee, on average, increases of about 2 percent
per annum. In 1986 they granted increases of 3.5 percent per annum,
on average. Public sector penSion schemes guarantee increases in line
with inflation. Although limited price increases are only a statutory requirement on pensions accrued after April 1997, it seems reasonable
to include the cost of increases to make the comparisons consistent.
Allowing for increases to pensions in payment will make money purchase pension schemes appear to perform less well than defined pension schemes.
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5 The Results
We begin by considering how well final salary pension schemes perform compared to the total service pension, and by presenting the estimated additional cost required to fund the difference between the
final salary pension and the total service pension for each category of
member. The benefits provided by a revalued career average pension
scheme also are considered. The pensions provided by money purchase
pension schemes are compared with the total service pension, and the
vulnerability of the plan participant to worse than expected investment
and salary experience is investigated.
A comparison of benefits with the basic state pension and with average earnings is presented in Appendix 3 to reinforce some of the
results.

5.1

Final Salary Defined Benefit Pension Scheme

Final salary pension schemes are considered to fall short of members' expectations on two counts: (i) because of their treatment of early
withdrawals, and (ii) because of cross subsidies between members. We
shall first consider early withdrawals.

5.1.1

Deferred Pensioner

The benefit paid to early withdrawals usually has a smaller value
than the reserve required for employees who remain with an employer.
Deferred benefits normally are increased at rates less than the rate of
increase in earnings. The results presented in Table 6 show, however,
that (given the set of assumptions used for the calculations) the differences are not exceptional. The calculation of the total service pension
effectively assumes that all service is completed contiguously and in
the years immediately preceding retirement. This is used as a proxy
for a final salary pension scheme that increases deferred pensions in
line with earnings. Table A4 in Appendix 2 gives the amount of the
total service pension accrued by each category of employee relative to
the full-time pension.
We can assess how poorly deferred employees do under the present
arrangements by comparing the total service pension with the pension
calculated assuming movements between part-time and full-time service do not interrupt pension accrual (called "part/full time continuous"). The difference in the two pensions arises because of the differ-
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ence between inflation and salary growth. We have calculations assuming a 1 percent and 2 percent real salary growth.
Table 6
Pension Allowing for Periods of Deferment
As a Percentage of Total Service Pension
Real Salary Growth
1% Growth 2% Growth
Full-Time
100.0%
100.0%
Break and Mixed
97.3%
94.7%
Late Break
92.5%
86.0%
Break and Part-Time
99.6%
99.2%
Early Break and Full-Time
96.3%
93.5%
Late Break and Full-Time
94.0%
89.1%
Short Break and Full-Time
93.7%
88.8%
Long Break and Full-Time
94.4%
89.7%
94.0%
89.1%
Late Start
Full-Time & Bonus
100.0%
100.0%
Cyclical
93.0%
86.7%

As expected, deferred pensioners do less well when the annual real
salary growth rate is large. In addition, they would do less well under
current legislation if inflation were high over the deferred period, as
the statutory increase in deferment is capped at 5 percent per annum.
Categories (other than the "full-time" and "full-time & bonus" categories) that appear to do relatively well under the present arrangements
are those with the smallest proportion of full-time employment. Their
earnings do not attract real salary increases; therefore, the difference
between deferred benefits and ongoing benefits does not significantly
reduce their expectations.
Table 7 gives the additional contributions (paid over a working lifetime) required as a percentage of annual salary to make up the shortfall
in pension identified in Table 6.
We also can consider the position of employees who are in full-time
paid employment throughout their career, but who change jobs frequently. Some employees choose to change jobs frequently, but employees increasingly are being offered temporary contracts-these employees have no choice about their job mobility. Between 1994 and
1995 the number of employees with temporary contracts increased 10
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Table 7
Additional Contribution Required
To Fund the Total Service Pension
*4/1 5/1
4/2
0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Full-Time
0.2% 0.1% 0.4%
Break and Mixed
0.6% 0.4% 1.2%
Late Break
Break and Part-Time
0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Early Break and Full-Time 0.4% 0.3% 0.8%
Late Break and Full-Time
0.6% 0.4% 1.2%
Short Break and Full-Time 0.6% 0.4% 1.3%
Long Break and Full-Time 0.5% 0.4% 1.0%
0.6% 0.5% 1.3%
Late Start
Full-Time & Bonus
0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.5% 0.4% 1.1%
Cyclical
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5/2
0.0%
0.3%
0.9%
0.0%
0.6%
0.9%
1.0%
0.8%
1.0%
0.0%
0.8%

*4/1, for example, refers to 4 percent real investment growth and
1 percent real salary growth.

percent to 1.5 million. The majority of persons in these jobs would have
chosen permanent employment had it been available (CSO, 1996). With
each withdrawal, the contribution to pension made by a period of service is effectively downgraded in a typical final salary pension scheme.
The results for employees who change jobs frequently are presented
in Table 8, and the extra contribution required to meet the shortfall is
shown in Table 9.
Table 8
Pension Allowing for Periods of Deferment
As a Percentage of Total Service Pension
Real Salary Growth
1% Growth 2% Growth
84.6%
Withdraw Every Five Years
72.5%
86.7%
76.1%
Withdraw Every Ten Years
96.3%
93.8%
Withdraw After Five Years Only

Tables 8 and 9 show that those employees who change paid employment frequently are disadvantaged in a final salary pension scheme if
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Table 9
Additional Contribution Required
To Fund the Total Service Pension
Withdraw Every Five Years
Withdraw Every Ten Years
Withdraw After Five Years Only

4/1
1.5%
1.3%
0.3%

5/1
1.1%
0.9%
0.3%

4/2
3.2%
2.8%
0.7%

5/2
2.4%
2.1%
0.6%

deferred pensions are increased in line with inflation only. The impact
of real salary increases has a more significant effect than the frequency
of job change, however, as shown in Table 10.
In certain circumstances, it is possible to redress the balance between early withdrawals and those who remain with an employer. For
an employer, the motivation to do so could depend on the reason for
leaving employment. Employees leave their jobs for several reasons,
e.g.:
• They choose to go to another employer;
• They are made redundant or their contract ends;
• They need time away from employment, for example, for child
care and would like longer than their statutory allowance.
Those employers who give employees the right to an extended break
without jeopardizing their future employment may have addressed the
grounds for complaint of one of the above groups. For example, the employee will be able to count the two periods of service as though they
were continuous for the calculation of benefit and frequently will be
allowed, for a nominal contribution, to have the break included as part
of their pensionable service. Employees seem to support this arrangement, even when they are unlikely to profit directly from it (Gough,
1997).

Similarly, those employees who are made redundant are already entitled to lump sum payments, as established in employment law. Part of
the redundancy payment could be directed toward a pension scheme.
In addition, if it can be agreed that at least part of the employer's contribution to an occupational pension scheme is in respect of deferred
pay, the redundancy payment could be increased to allow for this, and
that part of the lump sum could be compulsorily invested in a pension
arrangement.
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Table 10
Portion of Total Service Pensions Earned By
An Employee Who Regularly Changes Employment
Real Salary Length of Consecutive Employments (in Years)
Growth
1
2
5
10
20
1%
82.9% 83.0% 84.6% 86.7%
91.0%
2%
69.8% 70.4% 72.5% 76.1%
83.6%

The level of replacement income provided by the different pension
schemes for some categories of employee is shown in Table 11. The results suggest that if an employee in a final salary pension scheme must
take a break from paid employment, it should be taken early rather than
late. The deferred pension will then be in respect of a shorter period
of service. This differs from the position of an employee in a money
purchase pension scheme, where it is better to take a late break. With
the assumption of 1 percent real salary growth, the employee taking
an early break loses about 2 percent of the value of the total service
pension, and the employee taking a late break loses 3 percent. If there
is 2 percent real salary growth, the loss is in the order of 3 percent and
6 percent, respectively. The length of the break in employment also
affects the level of replacement income available from a final salary
pension scheme, although not substantially. The total service pension
is the same percentage of final salary, regardless of the assumption for
salary growth.
Table 11
Pensions as a Percentage of Final Salary
With Deferred Pension
2% Real
1% Real
Total Service
Salary
Growth
Salary
Growth
Pensions
46.7%
48.2%
50.0%
Early Break
44.5%
50.0%
47.0%
Late Break
54.7%
51.8%
Short Break
58.3%
Long Break
41.7%
39.4%
37.4%
Now we turn to the other cross subsidies. Cross subsidies exist
in any insurance arrangement, such as a defined benefit retirement
pension scheme. An obvious subsidy is from those who die just be-
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fore reaching retirement to those who survive well beyond pension age.
Other subsidies include:
• From employees with no dependents to those with dependents;
• From those who do not have much salary growth, particularly toward the end of their career, to those whose salary grows faster
than the average, particularly close to retirement (Wilkie, 1985).
The former problem is discussed in Section 6. The latter issue can
be considered by looking at the results for the "full-time-and-bonus"
employee.
This paper does not attempt to address the issue of cross subsidies.
We just consider the extent of their presence in the different schemes
under consideration.

5.1.2

Salary Growth

If we consider "full-time-and-bonus" employees, we can investigate
the different benefits available to employees whose salary falls when
approaching retirement. It is assumed that this category of employee
receives a 20 percent bonus on salary up to age 45 due, for example,
to overtime payments. Thereafter, the bonus stops and the employee
receives basic salary only. Consequently, the employee's pension will
be calculated using the same final salary as other full-time employees,
including those who have no history of overtime. The calculation of
the final salary pension ignores the bonus earned when the employee
was younger. Because of this problem with the formula, many final
salary pension schemes ignore so-called fluctuating emoluments (compensation) in the calculation of pensionable salaryll (GAD, 1991). The
employee is able to make other pension provisions, such as additional
voluntary contributions. If defined benefit pensions are intended to
maintain the level of income just before retirement, this arrangement
seems reasonable. A sizable proportion of pension schemes include
all pay in the calculation of pensionable salary, however, so it is worth
considering the alternatives. The results for the "full-time-and-bonus"
category are given in Table 12.
The relative values of the benefits depend heavily on the rate of
revaluation assumed to be applied in the revalued career average pension scheme. Even though the employee was assumed to earn 120 percent of the basic salary for 25 years, revaluation in line with inflation is
llThe salary included in the calculation of pension.
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Table 12
Revalued Career Average Pension Received by Full-Time
And Bonus Employees as a Proportion of Final Salary
Revalued in Line With:
Inflation
Salaries
1% Real Salary Growth
61.8%
75.0%
51.4%
75.0%
2% Real Salary Growth
Note: Total Service Pension is 66.7% of final salary.

unable to match the benefit from the final salary pension scheme. The
position is improved, however, when the pension scheme revalues pensionable salaries in line with salary growth. The employee effectively
earns 12.5 percent more pay over a working lifetime than an employee
who receives no bonus, and this is reflected in the pension.
Thus, employees with fluctuating emoluments that decrease in size
toward retirement may receive a higher pension from a revalued career
average pension scheme. It follows that a final salary pension scheme
that includes such employees, and incorporates their total pay in the
definition of pensionable salary, will incorporate some cross subsidy
from these employees to those without fluctuating emoluments. Using
similar arguments, it also follows that there is a cross subsidy from
those with lower salary growth than the average to those with higher
salary growth.
We shall now consider the revalued career average pensions of the
other categories of employee.
5.2

Revalued Career Average Pension Schemes

The employees who do relatively well in a revalued career average
pension scheme, even when the revaluation is only in line with price
inflation, are those who work part time. Because it is assumed that the
salaries of part-time employees do not increase any faster than price
inflation, this should not be surprising. Even so, the pension scheme is
unable to provide a pension as large as the final salary pension scheme.
If the rate of revaluation is increased to be in line with salary growth, the
position alters. All categories of employee do at least as well (full-time)
or better (all other categories) in the revalued career average pension
scheme as they would do in a final salary pension scheme. These results
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are shown in Table 13, assuming 1 percent real salary growth, and they
should be compared with those in Table 6.
The revalued career average pension, with revaluation in line with
earnings, restores the link to actual years worked that is partly lost in
the final salary scheme for those employees with breaks in their working
history. As a result, we see that a revalued career average pension
scheme can be used to remove the cross subsidy between stayers and
withdrawals, as well as between low and high earners. The pension
design depends not only on service, but also on how significant a year
of service is in terms of income to the employee.
Table 13
Revalued Career Average Pension
As Percentage of Total Service Pension
Revalued in Line With:
Inflation
Salaries
Full-Time
82.9%
100.0%
94.1%
118.2%
Break and Mixed
Late Break
89.0%
111.6%
Break and Part-Time
97.9%
119.9%
Early Break and Full-Time
86.9%
101.7%
86.9%
103.5%
Late Break and Full-Time
Short Break and Full-Time
84.9%
101.5%
89.0%
106.4%
Long Break and Full-Time
86.9%
101.7%
Late Start
Full-Time & Bonus
92.5%
112.5%
91.3%
113.4%
Cyclical
There are difficulties in adopting a sensible and fair level of revaluation. The data in Table 12 show the relative penalties to one category of
employee where revaluation is in line with inflation and salaries grow
faster than inflation. In addition, if a pension is viewed as deferred
compensation, then its value should reflect real levels of salaries when
it vests, otherwise part of the salary in each year of work prior to retirement has been devalued. Because a single, average rate of revaluation
must be applied to all members in a pension scheme, those employees
whose salaries increase faster than the average may feel that they are
subsidizing those with flatter salary progression. If the annual rate of
revaluation is appropriate for the industry in which the company oper-
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ates or even linked to actual rates of salary growth within the company,
the effect of the revaluation will be to maintain the real value of a year
of work. The extent of the cross subsidy will be reduced significantly.

5.3

Money Purchase Pension Schemes

The calculations show that, if the pension purchased under a money
purchase scheme is compared with the total service penSion, those
employees who have breaks in their employment appear to do better
than the standard "full-time" employee from money purchase pension
schemes (Table 14). For example, assuming a contribution of 5 percent salary to a money purchase pension scheme and 5 percent real
investment growth and 2 percent real salary growth, the "break-andpart-time" employee receives 89.4 percent of the total service pension,
whereas the "full-time" employee receives a pension of only 56.3 percent. The employees' career profiles assume they all begin their paid
employment with a period of full-time service, and the effect of these
early contributions is most significant: "break-and-part-time" employees do best because the largest proportion of their contribution is made
in the early years.
When replacement income is conSidered, the position is reversed;
full-time employees appear to do better. This apparent contradiction
arises because the total service pension is based on the proportion of
time worked, whereas the comparison for replacement income is based
on final annualized salary. That is, it will be relatively larger than the
total service pension for those whose paid employment included parttime work.
The contributions required throughout a working lifetime, as a constant proportion of salary, to reproduce the total service pension in
retirement (given the assumptions of the paper) are presented in Table
14. The pension being funded by each category of employee is the same
amount in the columns 4/1 and 5/1 and a higher amount in columns 4/2
and 5/2. The different assumptions for real salary growth do not have
a significant effect on the contribution required from those employees
with part-time service, as they only experience real salary growth for
a small proportion of their careers. There is a notable difference for
those employees working full time.
We can use Table 14 to form an idea of how vulnerable money purchase pension schemes are to changes in experience. For example, if a
full-time employee chose to contribute 8.9 percent of salary to a pension scheme (assuming 5 percent real interest and 2 percent real salary
growth) and the experience of the pension scheme turned out to aver-
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Table 14
Contributions to a Money Purchase Pension Scheme
Required to Fund a Total Service Pension
Full-Time
Break and Mixed
Late Break
Break and Part-Time
Early Break and Full-Time
Late Break and Full-Time
Short Break and Full-Time
Long Break and Full-Time
Late Start
Full-Time & Bonus
Cyclical

4/1
9.4%
7.0%
7.6%
7.4%
10.0%
9.2%
7.4%
8.7%
10.1%
8.2%
7.6%

5/1
7.0%
5.1%
5.5%
5.4%
7.6%
6.9%
7.1%
6.4%
7.8%
6.1%
5.6%

4/2
11.7%
7.6%
8.7%
7.6%
11.8%
11.0%
11.5%
10.1%
12.0%
10.3%
8.5%

5/2
8.9%
5.5%
6.4%
5.6%
9.1%
8.3%
8.7%
7.5%
9.3%
7.7%
6.2%

age 4 percent real interest and 1 percent real salary growth, the retirement pension provided by the pension scheme would be 5.5 percent
less than expected. The "break-and-part-time" employee contributing
5.6 percent would be 24.3 percent lower. These calculations are summarized in Table 15.
The data in Table 15 give an indication of the downside risk of using
money purchase arrangement to provide for retirement income. In the
U.K. for money purchase pension schemes operated by an employer,
there is an obligation for an actuary to recommend a level of contribution for a given target benefit. For individual money purchase pension
schemes (personal pension plans) a salesperson normally would provide estimates of the projected level of benefit, given certain levels of
contribution. The bases that can be used for the projection are prescribed. Currently the mid-range basis would permit 9 percent interest
and 3 percent inflation, which is not too dissimilar from the 5/2 assumption (it is more optimistic).
If the money purchase pension scheme earns interest at 8 percent
per annum rather than 9 percent, then its value, accumulated to retirement, will be less than estimated at the start. Similarly, if the employee
experiences real salary growth of 1 percent per annum rather than 2
percent, then the fund will receive less income from contributions and
will be smaller than originally estimated. Thus, the penSion it provides
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will be smaller. In addition, if interest rates at retirement are lower than
anticipated, the cost of the retirement annuity will be more expensive,
reducing the pension even further. In a money purchase scheme all
these risks are borne by the individual plan participant.
Table 15
Effect of Wrong Contribution Level
Percentage of
Total Service Pension *
Full-Time
94.5%
Break and Mixed
77.5%
84.0%
Late Break
Break and Part-Time
75.8%
Early Break and Full-Time
91.5%
89.7%
Late Break and Full-Time
Short Break and Full-Time
92.5%
Long Break and Full-Time
86.1%
92.1%
Late Start
94.6%
Full-Time & Bonus
Cyclical
82.0%

*Assumes that the contribution required to fund the total service pension, given
5 percent real interest and 2 percent real salary growth is paid and that actual
experience is 4 percent real interest and 1 percent real salary growth.
Those persons we are assuming are least able to accept the uncertainty of a money purchase pension scheme (for example, those with
some part-time employment) are the most vulnerable.
From Table 14 it should be apparent that if employees contribute
the maximum 17.5 percent of salary assumed under the money purchase and variable arrangement, in all cases the pension provided will
exceed the total service pension. The comparison for employees with
full-time paid employment only is straightforward. Those employees
with periods of part-time employment contribute at different rates depending on their status, making the comparison more difficult. Because the two categories concerned both begin paid work in full-time
employment, the importance of their early contributions together with
their depressed final salary (due to inflation only increases) makes the
money purchase pension scheme perform slightly better than the contributions paid would suggest.
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5.4

Case Study

We have seen that the employees who appear to do least well in
a final salary pension scheme are those who change jobs frequently.
The employee who changes jobs regularly, but is always in full-time
employment, and the cyclical category of employee both receive pensions of less than 85 percent of their respective total service pensions
from the final salary scheme. Consequently, we consider the pension
entitlements of these employees in more detail.
Assume an employee wishes to receive a pension equal to the total
service pension. This is equivalent to the revalued career average pension the employee would receive, if revaluation were in line with salary
growth. Because the revalued career average pension scheme meets the
aim, we only need consider money purchase and final salary pension
schemes.
There are various possibilities for the employee. For example, the
employee could:
• Join an occupational pension scheme and pay additional voluntary
contributions;
• Start a money purchase personal pension plan and pay the equivalent of the members' contribution to the pension scheme;
• Start a money purchase personal pension plan and pay the contribution believed necessary to fund 100 percent of the total service
pension; or
• Start a money purchase personal pension plan and pay the equivalent of the members' contribution to the pension scheme, with
the employer contributing the remainder.
Table 16 shows the contributions required by these employees to
fund a total service pension. If the employee joins a final salary pension scheme, then additional voluntary contributions are necessary to
increase the scheme's pension to the total service pension. These are
given in the first row of figures for each category. Otherwise the employee must join a money purchase pension scheme and fund the total
service pension himself or herself, perhaps in conjunction with an employer. The contribution required for this is given in the second row of
figures.
We should consider the employee's financial position while in employment, depending on the decision made. Assume members contribute 5 percent of their pay to the occupational pension scheme. Then
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Table 16
Contribution to Money Purchase Pension Scheme
Or Additional Contributions Required for Equivalent Pension
4/1
5/1
4/2
5/2
Change Jobs
Every 5 Years
Final Salary Scheme
1.5% 1.1% 3.2%
2.4%
Money Purchase Scheme 9.4% 7.0% 11.7%
8.9%
Cyclical
Final Salary Scheme
0.5% 0.4% 1.1%
0.8%
Money Purchase Scheme 7.6% 5.6% 8.5%
6.2%
Source: Tables 9 and 14.

the employee's gross pay will be reduced the amounts shown in Table
17. Categories 1), 2), 3) and 4) in the Table refer to the four options
discussed above, respectively.
Table 17
Contribution Required From Employee
Under Each Arrangement
4/1
5/1
4/2
5/2
5 years 1) 6.5% 6.1% 8.2% 7.4%
2) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
3) 9.4% 7.0% 11.7% 8.9%
4) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Cyclical 1) 5.5% 5.4% 6.1% 5.8%
2) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
3) 7.6% 5.6% 8.5% 6.2%
4) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%

The financial position of the employee in retirement will be the same,
except for the second option where the employee will fare less well.
For example, if the money purchase fund experienced 5 percent real
growth and the employees receive 1 percent real salary growth, the
fund of the employee moving jobs every five years would be able to
purchase a pension of 71.4 percent of the total service pension; the
cyclical employee's fund would be 89.3 percent of that necessary for
the total service pension.
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We need only consider the first, third, and fourth options. The third
option is the most expensive. The best alternative financially seems to
be the fourth option, where the employer contributes to the employee's
personal pension plan, because (assuming the assumptions are borne
out by experience) the employee receives the target pension and pays
the least contribution. The fourth option ignores the cost of other benefits provided by a defined benefit pension scheme (for example, the
cost of life insurance and the ill health pension). If these costs are included, the choice between the first and fourth options becomes more
difficult. In particular, as the benefit in the first option is provided
by a final salary pension scheme, the risk of the pension being lower
than expected because of poor investment performance is limited. With
the fourth option the risk of underperformance rests solely on the employee.
A revalued career average pension scheme would meet the target
benefit of both these categories of employee, provided revaluation was
in line with salary growth. If such a scheme is not available, then the
best chOice for both categories appears to be between:
• Joining a money purchase pension scheme where a reasonable
level of contributions are made by the employer and hoping that
the benefit of good investment performance will compensate for
the additional expenditure on insured benefits that might be necessary; and
• joining a defined benefit pension scheme final salary with the
certainty of a pension (and other benefits) which can be supplemented by additional contributions to compensate for revaluation
of deferred benefits at less than the rate of growth of salaries.
Few employers contribute to individual money purchase pension
schemes, and when employers have introduced occupational money
purchase schemes they have tended to pay lower contributions than
they would pay to a final salary pension scheme (NAPF, 1996). In practice, those employees with access to an occupational scheme are likely
to be in the second position; those without access to an occupational
scheme will have to choose the third option above, assuming they can
afford it. Again, the evidence shows that persons choosing to start individual money purchase pension schemes frequently pay a minimum
level of contribution and that there is a large proportion of the working
population with no pension provision other than that provided by the
state.
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Death in Service and Other Issues
Death in Service and Other Insurance Benefits

The results of Section 5 have ignored the provision for death and
other benefits provided by defined benefit pension schemes. This seems
a reasonable approach because, for some categories of employee, a
death benefit may not be important and may represent further cross
subsidy (from single members to those with dependents). Security for
dependents is important for a large percentage of the population, however, and should not be ignored.
The average death in service benefit provided by a defined benefit
pension scheme is a lump sum of approximately three times the annual salary at the time of death, together with a spouse's pension of 25
percent pensionable salary. This is unlikely to require a contribution
to a money purchase scheme much in excess of 1 percent of salary.12
The cost of the ill health (disability) pension is harder to estimate, but
could be as much as 4 percent of salary.13 These benefits could cost
more than the difference between the costs of the money purchase and
final salary pension schemes identified above. An obvious problem is
that those employees for whom such insurance is relatively expensive
are more likely to choose to join an occupational pension scheme, assuming one is available. This could increase the overall cost of defined
benefit pension schemes.
The cost of both these forms of insurance will increase with the
age at which contributions begin and also may increase throughout
the policy term. Money purchase pension schemes are likely to be relatively more attractive to younger employees, even ignoring the cost
of insurance, and this could be a problem for defined benefit pension
schemes. Employees could choose to opt out of occupational pension
schemes while young, expecting to be able to join their employers pension scheme when older. In the long run this could prove to be a poor
strategy because it will increase the average age of the membership of
occupational pension schemes, thereby increasing their average cost.
Because the provision of occupational pension schemes is voluntary,
employers may choose to close the pension schemes as the cost increases, leaving no pension scheme for aging employees to join. If
employers were able to make membership of pension schemes com12This figure was calculated assuming a term assurance for the lump sum necessary
to fund the benefit, allowing for the accumulated value of the money purchase fund.

13This amount was reached after some telephone inquiries to insurance companies.
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pulsory, as was possible in the past, this problem at least could be
avoided. 14

6.2

Administration

Most employers effectively meet the cost of administering occupational defined benefit pension schemes. Sometimes they only do so
implicitly, as they usually meet the balance of the cost of the pension
scheme. In any case, it is important that administration costs are kept
to a minimum.
One problem is in data storage-in final salary pension schemes this
is frequently used as a reason for excluding part-time and temporary
employees because it can be difficult to record the number of hours
worked each week. Data handling software packages are making such
advances that this should become less of a problem. The only information that needs to be stored for a revalued career average pension
scheme, regardless of category of employee, is the total revalued salary
to date. This can be uprated annually, for example when tax statements
are produced. Consequently, any additional data handling can be kept
to a minimum for all employees.
In individual money purchase schemes the plan participant will have
to meet the expenses of the provider. In an occupational money purchase scheme it is usual for the employer to meet the expenses. Because
of economies of scale, the expense margins are usually lower for group
schemes.

7 Summary and Conclusion
While the assumptions and methodology underlying the calculations
can be criticized for their simplicity, they still serve to demonstrate
some useful results.
For many working histories, a defined benefit occupational pension
scheme can offer good value for money. Revalued career average pension schemes, where revaluation is in line with earnings, meet many of
the criticisms of final salary pension schemes.
14Legislation was introduced in the U.K. prohibiting companies from making membership of an occupational pension scheme a condition of employment because of their
perceived problems with portability. If the portability problems were addressed, there
should be less objection to compulsory membership.
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Final salary pension schemes compare poorly with money purchase
pension schemes in some circumstances. Their two main weaknesses
are:
• When salaries grow significantly faster than inflation and deferred
benefits are increased in line with inflation only;
• When interest rates are significantly higher than the rate of salary
growth and than assumed in the funding basis and the extra returns are not passed to the members of a defined benefit pension
scheme.
The former condition primarily affects employees who change jobs. In
some cases employees change employment because they perceive an
advantage to a new job. The employer, who meets the balance of cost in
most defined benefit pension schemes, may have trained the employee
and perceive a significant finanCial disadvantage to the move. Most
employers feel justified in providing a deferred benefit that gives less
weight to the years worked with the employer than a retirement benefit
would give.
Persons increasingly are leaving employment because they have been
employed on a temporary contract or because they have been made redundant. In these situations there may be no financial compensation
to the employee (other than a redundancy payment to those entitled
under employment law), but presumably there is a perceived benefit
to the employer. To penalize these employees further by reducing the
amount of the pension they can expect to receive at retirement is less
justifiable.
The results show that in certain circumstances the extra cost required to revalue deferred benefits in line with earnings is not great. For
an employee changing jobs every five years the cost calculated varies
between 1.1 percent and 3.2 percent of salary per annum. If employers do not want to increase the overall cost of an occupational pension
scheme, an alternative is to review the target benefit provided at retirement.
This brings us to another cross subsidy: between employees experiencing different rates of salary growth. By comparing the benefits provided by a revalued career average pension scheme and a final salary
pension scheme we see that in a final salary penSion scheme those
employees with flatter salary progression effectively subsidize those
with faster salary progression. The problem is one of equity: each employee's pension year should be identified and given a fair weighting in
the calculation of the eventual benefit paid which leads to a revalued career average design where the rate of revaluation is linked to increases
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in earnings. With this design the problem of deferred benefits would
disappear.
The second circumstance in which money purchase pension schemes
outperform defined benefit pension schemes is also a question of equity. To whom does the surplus in a penSion scheme belong if the employer meets the balance of the cost? If the contribution is perceived
solely as deferred pay, then the surplus belongs to the members of the
pension scheme. As the employer's contribution can fluctuate without
any regard to the progression of employees' earnings and, in any case,
it is calculated in a way that is not intended to be member specific, it
may be unreasonable to assume 100 percent of the contribution is in
respect of deferred pay. If this is the case, some mechanism for sharing the surplus between the employer and the members of the pension
scheme could be devised. This could depend on the extent to which
the employer has a commitment to meet payments where the pension
scheme is in deficit and on the normal cost of the penSion scheme as
reported in the Companies Act accounts.
If some categories of employees are to be paid higher benefits in defined benefit pension schemes without the overall cost increasing, other
employees will have to receive lower benefits. A final salary pension
scheme could achieve this by reducing the target benefit in a pension
scheme by redUCing the rate of accrual, while introdUCing revaluation
for deferred benefits in line with salary growth. This leaves the problem
of cross subsidy between different rates of salary growth. A revalued
career average pension scheme can address both problems by removing the proportionately larger rewards available in final salary pension
schemes to those whose salaries increase faster than the average. While
probably not removing all of the cross subsidy (because some index of
average salary growth will have to be adopted by the pension scheme),
the problem is at least controlled. It is also demonstrably equitable and
consistent with the idea of pensions representing deferred pay.
Personal pension plans will always have something to offer employees. For example, they can be much more flexible than occupational
pension schemes. In particular, the majority of persons in paid employment do not have access to occupational pension schemes. Money
purchase pension schemes cannot offer insurance to the same degree as
a defined benefit pension scheme. The results of this paper reinforce
the work of others (for example, Davies and Ward, 1992) in demonstrating the difficulties of relying on money purchase arrangements,
particularly for the less well paid. It is possible to develop a reasonably
straightforward pension scheme that can offer a fair level of benefit to
many different categories of employee.
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Appendix l-Glossary of Terms
Additional Voluntary Contributions-In the U.K., members of occupational pension schemes are allowed to make additional voluntary
contributions, up to certain limits of their salaries, in order to increase their benefits in retirement. The contributions attract the
same tax relief as ordinary contributions to a pension scheme.
Appropriate Personal PenSion Plan-If an individual chooses to contract out of the state earnings-related scheme through a personal
pension plan, the U.K. Department of Social Security pays part of
the individual's national insurance contributions to an appropriate personal pension plan. This is known as the contracted out
rebate. The contributions must be accounted for separately from
the plan participant's other contributions. More than half of the
persons who have personal pension plans only have an appropriate personal pension plan; that is, they do not make any additional
contribution beyond the rebate made by the Department of Social
Security (Williams and Field, 1993).
Basic State Pension-In the U.K. (and most other developed countries)
the government pays a pension to those persons over the state
retirement age who satisfy certain eligibility requirements. In
the U.K. eligibility depends on the number of national insurance
contributions paid. Within European Union countries the level of
this pension varies between approximately 15 percent of average
salary and 25 percent of average salary.
Limited Price Increases-In the U.K. the 1994 Pensions Act prescribes
that for pensions accrued after April 1, 1997, defined benefit pension schemes must increase the pension in payment by limited
price increases. That is, pensions in payment must be increased
by the minimum of 5 percent or the rate of increase in the Retail
Prices Index over a year.
Linked and Nonlinked Policies-The value of contributions paid to
linked poliCies will change according to an associated investment
fund. Depending on the fund chosen, the contributions will be
more or less secure. The value of nonlinked poliCies can only increase and will do so at the rate of bonus declared by the insurance
company.
National Insurance Contributions-In the U.K. the national insurance
contributions are a tax levied on employees and employers for so-
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cial insurance benefits provided by the state. Employees only pay
the tax (which is scaled according to the amount earned) on pay
under the upper earnings limit. The insurance cover includes, for
example, unemployment benefits and maternity benefits, as well
as the basic state pension and the state earnings-related penSion.
Occupational Pension Scheme-A pension scheme providing pensions
in respect to a period of employment with an employer participating in the pension scheme. The participating employer must
make regular contributions to the scheme. Employees of participating employers can join the pension scheme, provided they satisfy its eligibility rules. Many occupational pension schemes only
cover certain categories of staff; frequently temporary employees
or those working part time are excluded (GAD, 1991). Membership cannot be compulsory. Whether employees who choose to
join the pension scheme make contributions depends only on the
scheme rules. The pension scheme can be defined benefit or defined contribution.
State Earnings-Related Pension-Some governments provide pensions
in excess of the basic level described above. This pension is usually salary related, although it is common for the definition of pensionable salary used in the calculation to be capped. In the U.K.
the pension is called the state earnings-related pension scheme
(SERPS), and it is based on an individual's upper band earnings
[the salary between the lower earnings limit (approximately equal
to the basic state pension) and the upper earnings limit (approximately seven times the lower earnings limit)]. SERPS is effectively
a revalued career average scheme, with an earnings cap.

Appendix 2-Career Patterns
Using the information provided in studies such as those by Martin
and Roberts (1984) and Dex (1984), and after discussion with the Equal
Opportunities COmmission, Davies and Ward (1992) use the career patterns given below:
1) No Breaks-Employed full-time throughout working life.
2) Break and Part-Time-Employed full-time until a relatively few years
are taken from paid employment for child care followed by parttime employment until retirement.
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3) Break and Full-Time-Employed full-time until a longer break from
paid employment is taken for child care followed by full-time employment.
4) Break and Mixed-Employed full-time until relatively few years are
taken from paid employment for child care followed by a mixture
of unemployment, part-time and full-time employment, finishing
with a gap in the employment record.
5) Late Break-Only two periods away from full-time paid employment,
the first for child care, the second over the period up to age 60
for other types of family care. There is also a period of unemployment.
6) Late Start-A gap in paid employment until the mid-20s, followed
by full-time paid employment except for a short break for child
care.
(Davies and Ward, 1992)
The categories used in this paper are given in Table Al which summarizes the paid work in different five year periods. Thus, for example,
a "break-and-mixed" category employee is assumed to be working part
time in paid employment for 75 percent of the week between the ages
45 and 49. The full-time-and-bonus category is assumed to work overtime until age 45 and then to continue basic full-time work
Table A2 presents the time spent in paid employment by each category as a percentage of the maximum assumed possible of 40 years
and the total service pension accrued as a percentage of that accrued
by a full-time employee.
If the salary of each category of employee were assumed to grow
at the same rate regardless of whether the employee was in full-time
or part-time work or employed or unemployed, then the ratios of total
service pension to full-time pension would be the same as the ratios of
service. The differences occur because it is assumed that salaries grow
at different rates, depending on employment status. Table A2 indicates
the retirement income lost, relative to the full-time income, due to the
different working profiles.
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Table A2
Comparing Time in Paid Employment
And Total Service Pension
Total Service Pension:
Real Salary Growth of:
1%
2%
Service
Full-Time
100.0% 100.0%
100.0%
51.9%
Break and Mixed
40.5%
31.6%
62.5%
53.8%
Late Break
46.4%
Break and Part-Time
63.1%
47.3%
35.5%
Early Break and Full-Time
75.0%
67.9%
61.5%
Late Break and Full-Time
75.0%
67.9%
61.5%
Short Break and Full-Time 87.5%
83.3%
79.3%
62.5%
53.8%
46.4%
Long Break and Full-Time
75.0%
67.9%
61.5%
Late Start
112.5% 100.0%
Full-Time & Bonus
100.0%
41.0%
Cyclical
50.0%
33.6%

Appendix 3-Results for Basic Pension and Average
Salaries
Most persons who have enrolled in personal pension schemes have
paid only the minimum contribution (that is, the contracted out rebate).
For someone earning an average wage in the 1995/96 tax year, this
amounted to just less than 5 percent of upper band earnings.1 5 Table
A3 shows that in many cases this level of contribution would provide a
pension not much greater than the basic state pension.
Table A3 also illustrates a potential problem that may arise due to
the British government's current policy of uprating the basic state pension in line with prices rather than earnings. In the discussion on money
purchase pension schemes, Table 14 demonstrates that the least beneficial experience for a money purchase pension scheme (of the bases
considered) was 4 percent real investment return and 2 percent real
lSUpper band earnings are those earnings between the lower earnings limit (£358 per
week in 1995/6) and the upper earnings limit (£440 per week in 1995/6). The state
earnings-related pension is based on upper band earnings.
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Table A3
Pension Provided by a Contribution of 5 Percent Salary,
Expressed as a Proportion of the Basic State Pension
4/1
5/1
4/2
5/2
Full-Time
184.1% 245.9% 216.6% 286.0%
Break and Mixed
99.2% 138.0% 105.8% 146.6%
122.3% 168.3% 134.9% 184.4%
Late Break
Break and Part-Time
110.9% 151.7% 118.3% 161.5%
Early Break and Full-Time 117.6% 153.6% 132.1% 170.9%
Late Break and Full-Time
127.3% 170.3% 142.5% 188.9%
Short Break and Full-Time 152.7% 203.4% 175.2% 230.7%
Long Break and Full-Time 106.8% 144.8% 116.8% 157.1%
Late Start
115.9% 149.7% 130.6% 167.4%
211.5% 284.3% 247.1% 328.5%
Full-Time & Bonus
Cyclical
93.0% 127.6% 100.3% 136.8%

salary growth. Here it appears that 4/1 is the worst. Similarly it appears 5/2 gives a lower pension than 5/1. This happens because the
basic state pension has been assumed to increase in line with prices
only. That is, the increase in salaries enters the equation on the asset
side (as increased contributions) only and not the liability side (where
it can represent increased standard of living).
We can present the pensions in Table A3 as a proportion of average
full-time earnings at retirement. The results are given in Table A4.
While the pension provided under the 4/2 assumption is a smaller
proportion of average salary than the pension provided under the 4/1
assumption, it is a larger amount. The assumption of 2 percent real
salary growth means that more contributions are paid to the scheme,
but not to such an extent that the pension can compensate for the larger
growth in average earnings.
The basic state penSion is currently about 15 percent of average
earnings. If real rates of salary increase 1 percent per annum, in 40
years the basic state pension would be only 10 percent of average earnings; if real salaries increase 2 percent, it would be 7 percent. Now
we can see the small amount of pension that some employees who contribute only the minimum amount to a money purchase penSion scheme
can expect to receive at retirement.
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Table A4
Pension Provided by a Contribution of 5 Percent Salary,
Expressed as a Proportion of Average Earnings
4/1
5/1
4/2
5/2
Full-Time
35.5% 47.4% 28.4% 37.5%
Break and Mixed
19.1% 26.6% 13.9% 19.2%
Late Break
23.6% 32.4% 17.7% 24.2%
Break and Part-Time
21.4% 29.2% 15.5% 21.2%
Early Break and Full-Time 22.7% 29.6% 17.3% 22.4%
Late Break and Full-Time
24.5% 32.8% 18.7% 24.8%
Short Break and Full-Time 29.4% 39.2% 23.0% 30.3%
Long Break and Full-Time 20.6% 27.9% 15.3% 20.6%
22.3% 28.9% 17.1% 22.0%
Late Start
40.8% 54.8% 32.4% 43.1%
Full-Time & Bonus
17.9% 24.6% 13.2% 18.0%
Cyclical

By gradually devaluing the basic state pension, the British government will find an increasing number of pensioners either accepting increasing levels of poverty or claiming income support. 16

16Income support in the U.K. is a means tested social security benefit paid to those
on low income.
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